Instead, empirical knowledge is most useful in unmasking the theo retical assumptions that undergird c. onstitutional law, in focusing those theories, and in contributing to a multidimensional view of society that informs the substance of constitutional law. In this cor respondence, I will examine the flaws in Judge Posner's attempt to substitute empiricism for constitutional theory. I will then explore three more constructive roles that empiricism can play in constitu tional law. 2. 518 U.S. 515 {1996). Posner also criticizes Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 {1996), although more summarily. Posner's errors in discussing Romer are similar to those in his treatment of United States v. Virginia. Because Posner focuses most of his fire on the Virginia decision, I concentrate on that case as well. Posner's empirical question masks an essential theoretical as sumption.7 Posner's theory of the Constitution holds that all nonju dicial government action is presumptively valid: a plaintiff challenging government action must demonstrate the invalidity of that action and satisfy a high burden of proof. The State of Vir-4. Posner, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520).
Id.
6. Although I focus on theoretical defects in Posner's argument, even his fact-based chal lenge is oddly misplaced. The Supreme Court's conclusion that neither VMI's goals nor its pedagogy was "inherently unsuitable to women" paralleled an identical determination in the court of appeals. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525 (quoting 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) ). Both conclusions, in turn, drew upon six days of trial-court testimony dominated by "an array of expert witnesses on each side." 518 U.S. at 523. This testimony established that " [s] ome women, at least, would want to attend [VMI] if they had the opportunity," that "some women ... are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets," and that "some women can meet the physical standards [VMI] now impose[s] on men." 518 U.S. at 540-41 (all but first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting find ings of fact from the lower courts). Indeed, VMI's own expert on educational institutions acknowledged: "I'm not saying that some women don't do well under [the] adversative model [used by VMI], undoubtedly there are some [women] who do." 518 U.S. at 541 (first and third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting district court opinion). The VMI trial, therefore, seems to have included exactly the type of empirical evidence Posner seeks.
Late in his lecture, Posner acknowledges that some women might qualify for VMI's train ing -although without noting that expert testimony in the trial court established just this fact Even so, Posner suggests, the small number of qualified women compared to qualified men justified Virginia's decision to select candidates based on sex; it would be inefficient for the state to test women individually. See Posner, supra note 1, at 15. On this point, as on the others I discuss, Posner simply disagrees with the Supreme Court's theory of the Equal Pro tection Clause. The Court repeatedly has held that sex, like race, should not serve as a proxy for qualifi cations that can be tested individually. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) .
7. As a prelude to his critique, Posner attempts to draw a distinction between constitu tional "theory" and "doctrine." See Posner, supra note 1, at 1-4. This distinction, like the attempt to distinguish theory and empiricism, is problematic. Even accepting Posner's theory/doctrine distinction, however, the assumption masked by his empirical question is a theoretical one. It is an overarching view of how judges should confront constitutional ques tions, incorporating (as many constitutional theories do) Posner's own perspective on the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
ginia, Posner reasons, concluded that women were unsuited for ca reers as citizen-soldiers or study at VMI; any challenger must prove the opposite.
The Justices on the contemporary Supreme Court, however, be lieve that the Equal Protection Clause mandates a different burden of proof when the state distinguishes citizens on the basis of sex. The state must justify the distinction, and that justification must be "exceedingly persuasive."8 Posner is entitled to disagree with the Supreme Court's theory of the Equal Protection Clause; some peo ple do. The point, however, is that Posner's disagreement is theo retical, not empirical. Posner wants the Court to stay its hand unless it is very sure that women will benefit from VMI's training. But the Court believes that the Equal Protection Clause forbids ex plicit gender distinctions unless the state can advance a substantial justification for them. The dispute lies in the realm of theory, not fact.
The theoretical disagreement emerges even more clearly when Posner restates the controversy underlying Virginia. "The issue," Posner concludes, "as it would appear to a disinterested student of public policy unburdened by commitment to any of the constitu tional theories, is whether excluding women from VMI is likely to do more harm to women ... than including them would do to the mission of training citizen-soldiers."9 This deceptively simple state ment, which Posner finds so self-evident, illuminates the theoretical gulf between the Court and him. Under Posner's formulation of the issue in VMI, a plaintiff challenging intentional, state-mandated sex distinctions must prove that the distinctions do more harm to women than they do good for the state. Posner's Equal Protection Clause is a balance on which even equipoise favors discrimination. As long as the harm to women is no greater than the benefits the state hopes to achieve, discrimination is permissible. Posner's "dis interested student of public policy" seems unburdened, not only by "any of the constitutional theories," but by the Fourteenth Amend ment itself.
Posner himself finally admits that he cannot abandon constitu tional theory in posing empirical questions.10 He even admits that 8. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524, 531; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S.127, 13 6-37 & n.6 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) .
9. Posner, supra note 1, at 16.
10. See id. at 18 ("I never meant to suggest that it is possible to approach constitutional issues free from any predispositions, free, that is, from an approach, or if you will , a theory.").
The concession, however, appears late in the lecture and Posner treats it briefly. (Vol. 97:1287 his theory of constitutional law is a spartan one that permits judicial intervention only when the challenged government action is truly "outrageous."11 Such a theory is fully consistent with imposing a heavy burden of proof on challengers to any government action. Posner's theory just isn't the theory espoused by a majority of the current Supreme Court -at least not in cases involving express sex discrimination.
If Posner concedes that he cannot dispense with theory, then what is the point of his tirade "against constitutional theory"? It is, I think, an attempt to disguise theoretical difference as commitment to empirical fact. This is a dangerous use of empiricism. By sug gesting that he has eschewed theory in favor of empirical inquiry, Posner deflects attention from his own theoretical assumptions. He tempts the reader to accept his outrage theory, which is quite differ ent from the modern Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, by implying that his conclusions depend upon undisputed facts, not controverted theories. Yet Posner's resolution of the VMI controversy delivers just as much theory as any conference of law professors.
Posner's approach misleads on a second level. Throughout his lecture, he raises a single empirical question about VMI's admis sions policy, insisting that resolution of the controversy required more knowledge "about the role of women in the military."12 Even if empirical inquiry could resolve the VMI case, why is this the only question, or even the most important one? Just :fifteen percent of VMI's graduates entered the military; the rest succeeded in busi ness, law, politics, and other professions.13 The school's endow ment reflected the material success of its alumni . VMI enjoyed "the largest per-student endowment of all public undergraduate in stitutions in the Nation."14 VMI students, moreover, depended upon the school's loyal alumni network to secure influential posi tions in the civilian sector.15 United States v. Virginia was not a dis pute over women in combat; it was a challenge to a state government that invested heavily in educating men for business and political leadership, that succeeded admirably in this endeavor, and that rigorously limited its special training to men.
11. See id. at 18 ("I happen to belong to what I earlier described as the school of 'outrage' .. .. "); id. at 4-6 {describing further the "outrage" school of constitutional theory).
12. See id. at 22.
13. See Virginia, 518 U. S. at 520, 522.
14. 518 U. S. at 520.
15. See 518 U.S. at 552-53.
Anyone who has seriously attempted empirical work knows that framing the question is as important as finding the answer. In sci ence, as in law, the questioner has considerable power to control the reply. By suggesting that resolution of the VMI controversy depended on a single empirical question, and that the question was obvious to any examiner, Judge Posner does a second disservice to genuine empirical inquiry. First, the process of empirical exploration unmasks constitu tional theory. Facts cannot be gathered without asking questions.
Demanding empiricism in constitutional law, therefore, requires judges and scholars to formulate research questions. As my brief review of Posner's lecture demonstrates, empirical questions may reveal an author's theoretical assumptions more tellingly than do pages of declarative text. One cannot ask for data without sug gesting that the data are relevant. Once the questions have been posed, one must also decide how much evidence is needed and who will bear the burden of production. Just as Posner's empirical ques tions about the VMI decision disclose his narrow interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, empirical queries by other theorists unveil their unarticulated assumptions. Empirical inquiry cannot replace constitutional theory, but it can illuminate the half-hidden theories that guide decisionmakers. In that role, empiricism is a useful adjunct to theory. Second, social science discoveries can influence the substance of constitutional theory -although not in the simple, direct manner many commentators suppose. Some advocates of empiricism imply that judges confronted with constitutional controversies can find 16. Notably, while Posner does raise the last of these questions, the extensive trial court testimony yielded a different answer than the one he prefers. See supra note 6. 17. Social science may fill roles beyond these three. For example, I do not discuss here the role of social science in legitimating constitutional decisions. The three roles I feature here, however, are the ones I consider most important for constitutional theorists and judges using social science. The Court's dismal performance has been chronicled elsewhere.
It cited "studies" that were simply assertions or news reports, in voked other studies with serious methodological flaws, and even re lied on works reaching the opposite conclusion from the one stated by the Court. and the societies they form are too complex and changeable to generate precise social science answers to constitutional controversies.24
Empirical studies, in other words, can't resolve constitutional is sues in the way that an almanac tells us the year in which Halley's Comet will next appear or the population of Wisconsin.25 Social science offers no answer key for constitutional questions. But em pirical work does contribute significantly to the broader social knowledge that informs constitutional theory. Social science find ings help shape judges' and theorists' views of the world around them, and often challenge deeply held beliefs a bout that world. As our understanding of society shifts, new social perceptions some times produce new constitutional meaning . 2 6 This was the true role of social science in Brown v. Board of Education. 21 The nine Justices who rendered that historic opinion surely did not fashion a neutral empirical question -can separate ever be equal? -and then scan the social science literature for an answer. Instead, they most likely reached a social conclusion, that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"28 through a complex intellectual journey. The journey may have included personal observation of racial interactions, reflection on . their own educational experience and that of their children, consideration of contemporary and historical accounts of segregation, fresh memo ries of a war in which odious racial classifications figured promi nently, philosophical musing about the nature of equality, resolution of prior challenges to the separate-but-equal doctrine in higher education, and examination of a growing body of social sci ence literature documenting the effects of segregation. Social sci ence was but one of several strands weaving a picture of an unequal 167, 183-85 (1988) (discussing tlle "conceptual" or "enlightenment" functions of social science).
347 U. S. 483 (1954).
28. 347 U. S. at 495. of the community. Should a minority composing ten percent of the community be represented on every jury, or on three quarters of those juries? Will representation on less than half of the juries suf fice?32 The dialogue might also have prompted the Court to re examine some aspects of jury performance that it took for granted.33 The questions generated by social science, in other words, would have been as important as the answers in pressing the Court to refine its theory of the jury.
Courts, of course, have little capacity to engage in constructive dialogue. Once a controversy reaches a panel of judges, it must be decided.34 This third function of social science in constitutional law, therefore, promises a special place for academics. By engaging so cial scientists in an ongoing dialogue on social issues, constitutional theorists could broaden our understanding of the social context in forming the Constitution and also sharpen interpretations of that document. Legal theorists working with social scientists could deepen both social knowledge and constitutional theory in the years before judges must resolve a controversy.
I end, therefore, with a plea that Chief Judge Posner would en dorse: Constitutional theorists should pay more <l;ttention to social science. Empiricism won't replace theory; it won't even answer most of the controverted questions. But empiricism will expose the preconceptions underlying constitutional theory, it will stimulate new questions about those theories, and it will enrich the cultural understanding that informs all constitutional law. If empiricism succeeds on these three fronts, it will amply reward the constitu tional scholars and judges who pursue it.
32. See Saks, supra note 21, at 19 (noting that in a population with a 10% minority group, 72 % of twelve· member juries will include at least one of those minority members, while only 47% of six-member juries will do so).
33. For example, the Court's assumption that "the reliability of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems likely to be a function of its size," Williams, 399 U. S. at 100-01, proved dubious. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223, 232-35 (1978) (citing empirical studies).
34. Techniques judges use to avoid or limit constitutional decisions can play an important role in continuing dialogue over social issues. Even under these circumstances, however, the court defers decision so that others may continue the dialogue.
